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We study the e¤ect of encouraging private actions for breaches of competition law. We
develop a model in which a plainti¤, who may have private information about whether a
breach of law has been committed, decides whether to open a case against a defendant. If
opened, the case may be settled out of court or may proceed to full trial. The authorities
can facilitate private actions by lowering the costs of opening a case or of proceeding to
a full trial, or by raising the damages to be expected in the event of success. We show
that facilitating private action increases the number of cases opened and sometimes but
not always makes plainti¤s more aggressive in pre-trial bargaining. The latter, if it occurs,
tends to make defendants who have committed anti-trust violations more likely to settle
than innocent defendants. We also show that for screening to work requires the Court to be
committed to rely only on submitted evidence in the case, and not on other possibly relevant
background material. We nally study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of
private litigation on antitrust enforcement and prove that it is better to increase damages
that to reduce costs of initiating a suit. In particular we nd large benets from introducing
a system of compensation for Defendants found non-liable, paid by unsuccessful plainti¤s.
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1 Introduction
1.1 The problem
Is it a good idea to encourage private civil actions by those who have su¤ered from breaches
of competition law? The United States has long been home to a culture of private antitrust
litigation, encouraged in part by the availability of treble damages, while such litigation has
been comparatively rare in Europe. This may be about to change: the European Commission
has opened a debate on whether and how to increase the frequency of private antitrust
litigation in the EU. In 2005, it issued a Green Paper entitled Damages actions for breach
of the EC antitrust rules. After a rst public consultation and discussion by the European
Parliament, the Commission published in April 2008 a White Paper that proposed a rst set
of measures. The Commissions aim to facilitate private actions in Europe was encouraged by
a comprehensive study by Waelbroeck and al. (2004). This study contrasts the situation in
the EU, where very few private actions take place, with that in the US, where approximately
ten private actions are undertaken for each action by the public authorities. The EU expects
that inducing private parties to play a part in antitrust enforcement will enhance Europes
competitiveness and encourage companies to innovate, leading to economic growth and job
creation (for a discussion see McMichael and Kemp 2007). Whether this expectation is
realistic is the subject of this paper, which models the e¤ect of encouraging private actions
for breaches of competition law. We then study the optimal design of rules for private
litigation so as to enhance their role in enforcement.
Encouraging private actions may help enforce competition law by making use of decen-
tralized information. Customers, suppliers or competitors that are hurt by anticompetitive
behavior are likely to have relevant information about such breaches of competition law;
giving them an opportunity to bring this information to a court in order to seek compen-
sation may help punish violators and, in this way, contribute to deter future breaches of
law. As Shavell (1984) argues, "private parties should generally enjoy an inherent advan-
tage in knowledge" over public enforcers. Thus it is easier for them to analyze their own
activities and those of their competitors. "For a regulator to obtain comparable information
would often require virtually continuous observation of partiesbehavior, and thus would be
a practical impossibility."
 We are grateful to three anonymous referees, to Greg McCurdy and to participants in seminars in
Florence, Toulouse, the ACLE 2007 conference in Amsterdam, the 3rd CRESSE conference in Athens and
the EARIE 2008 conference in Toulouse for helpful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.
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However, encouraging private parties to sue violators of competition laws may result in
excessive, even frivolous actions, undertaken despite low evidence of a breach of antitrust
laws. Interested parties may have an incentive to complain for wrong reasons - for instance
to weaken a rival through legal harassment or to induce the rival to desist from behavior
that increases the intensity of competition on the market. This concern may be particularly
serious when pro- and anti-competitive behavior can have supercially similar e¤ects. For
example, both predatory pricing and competition on the merits can be quite hard to distin-
guish at rst sight, and may equally harm competitors. Similarly, a supplier or distributor
may be terminated either because it is ine¢ cient or alternatively to exclude or harm rivals in
vertically related markets. The same applies to tying, which can be motivated by e¢ ciency
gains but also by exclusionary motives in adjacent markets. As a result, private parties may
have an incentive to launch a complaint even if they do not have any specic knowledge of
wrongdoing and in some extreme cases, even if their information suggests there was no
anti-competitive behavior at all.
To analyze the role of private actions in enforcing competition law, we therefore develop
a framework which accounts explicitly for interested partiesprivate information and incen-
tives. The main ingredients are as follows. First, rms have the opportunity of undertaking
protable actions, a fraction of which are anticompetitive. A potential plainti¤ then obtains
private information about whether the action is indeed anticompetitive and chooses whether
to launch a case. Opening a case is costly, due to the expenses incurred in retaining lawyers,
preparing documents, court fees, and so on, as well as the costs of collecting su¢ cient data
for initiating a private antitrust action. The rules on the disclosure of documents and the
standard of evidence inuence the magnitude of these costs. Di¤erent values of these pa-
rameters thus reect di¤erent judicial regimes, with high values describing the European
regime in which the costs of collecting evidence are borne largely by the plainti¤, and low
values describing the US discovery system in which many of the costs are borne by the
defendant.
If the case goes to trial, the proceedings generate evidence about whether or not the
competition law has been violated. We assume that the evidence is not completely reliable,
which implies that the court may make some errors. If a breach of law is established in court
the plainti¤ is awarded damages against the defendant. The magnitude of these damages
constitutes another key parameter of the framework, and reects measures such as the in-
troduction of multiple damages, as in Canada or the US where double and treble damages
are respectively awarded to successful plainti¤s.
A complete analysis of private antitrust enforcement cannot ignore the possibility of
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private settlements. Indeed, in practice, the majority of cases that are led ultimately settle
before trial, which allows the parties to save some of the costs of the proceedings. We model
pre-trial bargaining between the plainti¤ and the defendant by assuming that, once the
plainti¤ has launched the case, and before going to trial, it makes a settlement o¤er to
the defendant. If (and only if) the defendant refuses the o¤er, the case proceeds to trial.
The relative magnitude of the costs of the two phases (launching a case and going to trial)
depends on the specicities of the judicial system. In the US, for example, settlements often
occur when the plainti¤ is granted discovery. In Germany, settlements usually take place
instead when the court decides that the defendant is liable, before the last stage of the trial
determining the damages. Also, since many EU member states use a loser-pays rule, we rst
assume that the costs of the trial (i.e., the second phase) are supported by the losing party,
but consider later on the e¤ect of a division of the costs in some proportion between the
losing and winning parties.
The possibility of private settlements has important consequences. To be e¤ective at
deterring violations of competition law, private actions should lead to signicantly greater
costs for rms that have violated the law than for those that have not. It is natural to
think that the way private actions achieve this goal is by bringing violators of the law in
front of the courts. However, as already noted in the literature (see next section), when
pre-trial bargaining takes place, violators have more incentives to settle while innocent rms
have more incentives to resist and go to trial. In a system that is working well, the courts
therefore become a place where the non-violators go to prove their innocence rather than
a place where violators are tried and punished. Indeed, prudent violators will settle long
before a trial is reached.
In our context, these incentives create an adverse selection problem which may make
private actions ine¤ective in deterring anticompetitive behavior, since violators and innocent
defendants may end up being treated alike. If the courts took into account that defendants
are less likely to settle when innocent, they would be inclined to decide in favor of those
defendants that go to trial. But if they did so, it would no longer be attractive to violators
to settle. As a result, all equilibria would involve complete "pooling", where either no
plainti¤s ever launch a case, or all the cases that are launched are settled for the same amount
independently of whether the defendant breached the law. In inducing non-liable Defendants
to settle as well, the private antitrust actions regime would fail to enforce competition law,
simply transferring resources from defendants to plainti¤s, without sorting antitrust violators
from others.
In practice, things do not work quite this way. Far from taking into account the likely
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proportions of violators and non-violators appearing before them and using these do decide
the appropriate weight to give to the evidence, the courts are typically constrained to rely on
rules of evidence and standards of proof that are independent of the statistical characteristics
of the case. We show in this paper that this is a desirable, even essential feature of the judicial
system when pre-trial bargaining plays an important role in determining who appears before
the courts. There is a more e¤ective screening of violators from non-violators (and therefore
a more e¤ective anti-trust enforcement) when the rules of judicial procedure oblige the court
to rely solely on the facts established during the trial and not on background evidence about
settlement o¤ers. Another way of expressing this is that the courts should not act as Bayesian
decision-makers; their decision-making should be independent of what they know about the
incentives for violators and non-violators to settle out of court.
It is central to our analysis that private actions should encourage parties who have in-
formation relevant to the enforcement process to reveal it. Indeed, unless this occurs the
authorities would do as well by opening investigations randomly. This makes it all the more
important to understand why Bayesian reasoning is not an appropriate procedure for the
courts to use. The reason is that in the presence of pre-trial bargaining between the parties
the deterrent impact of private actions arises not directly through the sanctions imposed
by the courts but rather by the pressure placed on defendants to settle for large sums if
they expect to lose the case. The procedure of the courts has therefore to be designed not
just to allow them to make the optimal decision conditional on the facts of the cases that
appear before them, but also to give the right incentives for settlement by the parties, a
settlement that will in turn a¤ect the types of case that go to trial. We show that the need
to give the right incentives for settlement typically requires the courts to restrict the kinds
of information that may be allowed in evidence: thus, paradoxically, a procedure whose sole
point is to encourage the revelation of relevant information must, if it is to work well, use
less than the full information that it thereby makes available to the courts.
We discuss how the e¤ectiveness of private actions depends on various parameters of the
judicial process, with nes being a more e¤ective deterrent than the fear of legal costs since
the latter are more likely to discourage legitimate pro-competitive behavior. In principle
transfer payments (such as nes) are better than real costs (such as the costs of proceedings),
both because transfer payments do not involve real resource costs and because it is usually
easier to target them more precisely on those who break the law. Furthermore, we show that
the procedure can be enhanced if symmetric transfer payments are introduced for defendants.
By this we mean that rewarding successful defendants with compensation payments from
unsuccessful plainti¤s can restore a more e¤ective balance between the deterrence of anti-
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competitive actions and the encouragement of pro-competitive actions. However, given that
there are practical limits to the extent to which nes and compensation payments can be
used (because of limited liability, for instance), it is not always true that costs of proceedings
should be minimized. For instance, it may be better not to encourage private actions by
reductions in the costs of opening a suit. Indeed, this may lead to higher eventual costs of
proceeding to trial and will encourage well-founded and poorly-founded cases to the same
degree. We show that, under such constraints, private actions should not be encouraged
unless the plainti¤s have information whose quality exceeds a certain threshold; otherwise
the fear of such actions will deter legitimate pro-competitive activities by rms. This need
to avoid deterring legitimate pro-competitive activity is what distinguishes the analysis of
anti-trust actions we perform here from the more general analysis of legal procedure with
negotiated settlement, and it gives a distinctive avor to our characterization of the optimal
procedure, and notably to its "caution" in the use of private information.
We do, however, make a number of simplications to enhance the clarity of our analysis
and to bring out the intuition of the results, most of which we discuss as we set out the
model. One that should be stated at the outset is that we consider only the direct nancial
motives of plainti¤s for bringing private actions in pursuit of damages, and only the direct
nancial costs damage payments and the cost of trial may impose on defendants. As we have
suggested, there are a number of important strategic motives that might lead some plainti¤s
to open cases (such as the wish to weaken competitors), and there are some corresponding
strategic costs that such cases may impose on defendants. Our simplication is motivated
by the fact that such strategic considerations may be quite complex. Though they will often
bear particularly heavily on defendants who have committed no violation of antitrust action,
and therefore provide a reason for the public authorities to err on the side of caution before
facilitating private actions, there are also some circumstances in which strategic consider-
ations may have an opposite bias: when plainti¤s are discouraged from seeking redress for
antitrust violations because they are clients or suppliers of the defendant for instance. It
is di¢ cult to be condent about the overall bias of such strategic motives, if only because
actions encouraged for such reasons are more visible than actions discouraged. Nevertheless,
even when we ignore such strategic motives, it will become clear that the risk of encouraging
actions that are motivated purely by the hope of nancial reward due the to uncertainty
of the outcome of litigation should be an important brake on the enthusiasm with which
private actions are encouraged.
Some other complications we ignore include the extent to which class actions may di¤er
from those brought by individual plainti¤s, and more generally issues that arise out of
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possible heterogeneity between plainti¤s other than in respect of the reliability of their
information about whether an antitrust violation has been committed. These are interesting
questions but they go substantially beyond those raised in this paper.
Our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature in order to
emphasize what is novel in our own ndings. Section 3 describes the model and emphasizes
the negative role of Bayesian reasoning on settlement bargaining. Section 4 characterizes
the partiesbehavior when Bayesian reasoning is excluded - that is, when the courts are
constrained to rely on the evidence before them without using other background evidence.
In section 5, we design the optimal rules for private antitrust litigation when this may modify
their incentives to undertake anticompetitive actions. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Review of the literature
2.1 Literature on the economics of judicial procedure
Some of the elements of our analysis are already well known in the literature, and we note
them here so as to emphasize what is original in our results. Spier (2007) provides a compre-
hensive review of the law and economics of litigation, a literature that goes back to Landes
(1971), Posner (1972) and Gould (1973). As she emphasizes, it is well known that pre-trial
settlement may result in the innocent being disproportionately represented among the cases
that go to trial (see Grossman and Katz (1983), Bebchuk (1984), Reinganum and Wilde
(1986), Reinganum (1988), and Baker and Mezzetti (2001)). What we show is that this
fact requires restrictions on the use of certain information by the courts if the appropriate
incentives for deterring anti-competitive, and encouraging pro-competitive behavior are to
be maintained. Indeed, while Spier (2007) notes in her review that encouraging productive
economic activities is an important desideratum in general for the design of litigation proce-
dures, we show that this is critical inter alia for the information that courts may use. Our
paper is the rst to our knowledge to characterize the problem of designing a system of pri-
vate anti-trust actions as one of inducing the optimal use of private information of potential
plainti¤s so as to discourage undesirable behavior among defendants without discouraging
desirable behavior. The critical role played here by the sensitivity of pro-competitive actions
to the threat of litigation is what distinguishes the analysis of anti-trust actions from the
domain of litigation more generally.
Other authors have argued for restrictions on background information but in a context
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di¤erent from ours. Daughety and Reinganum (1995, 2000a, 2000b), Spier (1997) and Fried-
man & Wickelgren (2002) have noted that for the courts to use Bayesian reasoning may
have a negative e¤ect on deterrence. We build on this insight to show what restrictions are
required for the judicial system to use the private information of the parties to create the
right balance of deterrence and encouragement of pro-competitive actions1. Fluet and De-
mougin (2006, 2008)) make a similar point but in a quite di¤erent context without pre-trial
settlement. They consider the provision of ex ante incentives to exert care in tort litigation
and show that better ex ante incentives are provided by not relying on evidence such as
background statistics or character evidence. However, this has nothing to do with incentives
for out-of-court settlement, which has no place in their model. Secondly, the nature of the
evidence they nd it would be desirable to exclude is di¤erent: they show that litigation
provides better ex ante incentives by excluding evidence that is insensitive to the parties
decisions or actions, while our own result excludes evidence about the likelihood of guilt
conditional on the outcome of pre-trial bargaining.
An important contribution to the economics of litigation design was Shavell (1982), who
studies the relative merits of alternative methods for the allocation of legal costs. The liter-
ature on the economics of settlement is comprehensively reviewed in Daughety (2000) and
Daughety and Reinganum (2008) who note the extreme sensitivity of judicial outcomes to
the nature of the rules governing how settlement takes place. Among the rst explicit settle-
ment models, Png (1983) and Ordover and Rubinstein (1986) already introduce asymmetric
information (in static and dynamic settings, respectively), but postulate a xed settlement
amount (the only decision being whether to accept or not). The type of settlement negotia-
tion in our model is closest in spirit to Bebchuk (1984), who allows an uninformed plainti¤
to choose the terms of the settlement; the defendant has private information about the prob-
ability of being found liable, which lies within some range, and, as here, accepts an o¤er
when it is likely to be found liable. Wickelgren (2004) builds on Bebchuk (1984) and shows
that introducing the possibility of settlements lowers welfare by reducing deterrence; the
intuition is that the settlement amount imposes a damage cap, preventing the defendants
liability covering the full range of possible harms. Finally, Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
study a bargaining framework in which the plainti¤ has more information than the defen-
dant about the level of damages (in contrast, the probability of a judgement of liability is
xed and common knowledge); the plainti¤s o¤er then involves an element of signalling.
These contributions provide valuable insights that we have deployed in the present paper in
1A di¤erent type of argument is found in Schrag and Scotchmer (1994) who propose restrictions on
admissible evidence when courts are prejudiced against habitual criminals.
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order to focus explicitly on a framework of optimal deterrence.
A more complex argument is due to Daughety and Reinganum (1995) who study the
admissibility of the outcome of pre-trial negotiations as evidence in courts. This is a signalling
model in which an informed Plainti¤makes a settlement o¤er to the Defendant that may be
observed by the Court, and show that the observation of this o¤er by the Court is benecial
to Plainti¤s but damaging to Defendants. They do not draw general conclusions for the
optimal design of the judicial system. In contrast to our own model, it is the observation
of the amount (rather than the fact) of the settlement o¤er that causes the breakdown of
the separating equilibrium. We show something stronger: the mere fact that the judge may
take into account the rejection of the o¤er su¢ ces to rule out any desirable screening, even
if the judge does not observe the o¤er. The di¤erence between this model and our own lies
in the fact that for Daughety and Reinganum (1995) the Court observes either the truth or
nothing. The stronger result follows, as we show here, when the Court always observes an
informative but imperfect signal2.
2.2 Literature on anti-trust litigation
There is also a literature on anti-trust enforcement that has studied somewhat di¤erent
concerns, or used a rather di¤erent modeling framework, from our own. Private enforcement
was rst studied by Becker and Stigler (1974) who argue that free competition among private
law enforcers for the damages levied against convicted violators could achieve deterrence as
e¢ ciently as optimal public enforcement. Martini (2004) analyzes anti-competitive actions
where rms are engaged in price-xing and form a cartel acting as a monopolist. Martini
shows that, in his model, private enforcement of the antitrust laws dominates a public
enforcement regime. However, this result depends upon di¤erences in the objective functions
of the two antitrust agents: private enforcers only care about their surplus and thus consider
the reward they get in presence of anti-competitive activities as an incremental surplus, while
the public agency takes into account both consumersand producerssurplus and sees the
ne as a monetary transfer. As a consequence, private enforcers credibly engage in a higher
2Daughety and Reinganum (2000a) introduce an axiomatic (non Bayesian) model of evidence aggregation
in trial courts followed by a Bayesian Appeal Court. They model trial courts as non Bayesian not for any
reasons of optimal procedure but because they argue that it is not a reasonable approximation to feasible
real-world procedures. Daughety and Reinganum (2000b) use the same axiomatic model and show that there
is a systematic pro-Defendant or pro-Plainti¤ bias in the courts decision. Though these papers are very
di¤erent in spirit from Daughety & Reinganum (1995) and from the present paper they indicate how rich
are the questions raised by the reasoning processes involved in Court decisions.
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level of investigation activity than that set by a public agency.
It is widely recognized in the antitrust literature that treble damages can create per-
verse incentives for private enforcers. Breit and Elzinga (1974) have argued that under a
multiple damages remedy, private parties may even seek to increase the damage they su¤er
in anticipation that they may be multiply rewarded for the resulting increase in damages3.
Multiple damages may, for that reason, induce plainti¤s to get damaged. In addition,
hostile takeover targets often initiate antitrust cases against the bidders, because this may
create long delays and therefore allow the target rm to achieve some anti-takeover strategies.
Salant (1987), recognizing these perverse incentives, analyzes a model of private antitrust
enforcement and states that the size of the damage multiple imposed for antitrust violations
has neutral welfare consequences. This result holds because the expected damage award
is a pure transfer. Besanko and Spulber (1990) show that this result is not robust to the
introduction of asymmetric information. It should be noted, though, that enforcement in
the latter two papers comes from consumers and not from competitors or other third par-
ties. Furthermore, plainti¤s have no private information, and the parties do not have the
possibility of settling before the trial.
McAfee, Mialon, and Mialon (2008) compare private and public enforcement of the an-
titrust laws in a simple strategic model of antitrust crime and lawsuits with asymmetric
information. In their model, a rm chooses whether or not to violate the antitrust laws,
harming both competitors and consumers. They assume that private rms are ex ante more
likely than the government to be informed about antitrust violations, but are also more
likely to use the antitrust laws strategically. They show that when policy makers trust in
the ability of the courts to make the right decision, they should encourage private antitrust
enforcement. However, when the court may make mistakes and public enforcers are quite
e¢ cient, policy makers should discourage private enforcement. Contrary to us, they do not
consider the possibility of settlement before the trial, although in reality most cases do not
go to trial because settlement o¤ers are made. Furthermore, they only allow treble damages
as a tool to encourage private actions while we also consider the e¤ects of modications to
the costs of launching a complaint or of the complete trial.
The e¤ects of multiplying, and in particular trebling, damages on private antitrust liti-
gation with the possibility of out of court settlements are discussed by Briggs, Huryn and
McBride (1996). Contrary to their model, we allow the jurisdiction to encourage private
actions by other means than multiple damages and analyze their e¤ects on the incentives of
3They suggest that these incentives may have been at work in the electrical equipment conspiracy of the
1950s.
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the plainti¤ to sue and to settle. Polinsky and Che (1991) also analyze private antitrust liti-
gation when out of court settlements are allowed. They show that decoupling the rewards to
the litigant from the penalties for the violator reduces the plainti¤s incentive to sue without
a¤ecting the potential defendants incentive to exercise care. However, their analysis is made
under symmetric information between the di¤erent parties and assumes perfect enforcement
of the law. In contrast, we introduce private information on the side of the defendant and
on the side of the plainti¤ as well; we also study the consequences of imperfect enforcement.
As we show, it is the presence of private information that gives pre-trial bargaining such
striking consequences, for plainti¤s use their bargaining to try to induce separation between
violators and innocent defendants4.
3 Framework and preliminary analysis
We rst present our framework, in which rms may or may not have breached competition
law, and potential plainti¤s, with imperfect information about the existence of such a breach,
must decide whether to launch a case and can moreover o¤er to settle out of court. We then
use this framework to make preliminary observations concerning the role of beliefs in court
proceedings and the type of evidence that judges and courts should rely upon.
3.1 Framework
There is a large population of initially identical rms.NB of them ("B" standing for "Breach"
of competition law) get the opportunity to undertake an anticompetitive action, which gen-
erates an extra benet for the rm but a welfare loss L to consumers or society; at the same
time, NN rms (where "N" stands for "No breach") get the opportunity to undertake an
action that looks similar but is not anticompetitive and generates both a benet for the rm
and a welfare gain G.5 Letting B and N denote the (endogenous) probabilities that the
rms take advantage of these two types of opportunities, social welfare (gross of enforcement
costs) is then equal to
NNNG NBBL:
We want to study how and to what extent private litigation can help foster the enforcement
of antitrust laws, by reducing the adoption of anticompetitive behavior, represented by B,
4See Daughety and Reinganum (2005) for a survey of settlement bargaining in civil litigation.
5We thus allow a given rm to either commit a breach or to undertake a legitimate action, but not to do
both. This avoids complications by ruling out the possibility of simultaneous legal proceedings for the same
rm, but nothing important turns on this assumption for our arguments.
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without deterring procompetitive actions, represented by N . We will model the rms
benets from undertaking these actions more precisely later on, and focus for the moment
on the resulting exposure to litigation.
As discussed above, while potential plainti¤s may have useful information about anti-
competitive behavior, we cannot take for granted that they will complain only when their
case is well-founded. We model this by assuming that, for each action that is undertaken,
there is a potential plainti¤ with imperfect information about the pro- or anticompetitive
nature of the action, who must decide to launch a case, given the expected costs and benets
of doing so and the information received.
Whenever a proceeding is initiated, the participants are the Defendant (D), the Plainti¤
(P ) and the Judge (J). Though we speak of the Judge as a single individual she can equally
be interpreted collectively, as a court. Since by assumption P can initiate a proceeding only
when the rm has adopted one of the behaviors in question, there are two states of nature
 2 fB;Ng:  = B corresponds to a case in which D has indeed committed a breach of
competition law while  = N corresponds to one in which there has been no breach. D
knows  (and we will denote by D a Defendant of type ) while P and J initially expect





We will allow P and J to gather additional information, which is however imperfect and may
generate both type I and type II errors. More precisely, P and J respectively observe two
signals s and , about whether a violation has occurred. Each signal can take two values, 1
or 0, and is correlated with the existence of a breach of competition law: Pr (s = 1j = B) =
Pr (s = 0j = N) = r, and Pr ( = 1j = B) = Pr ( = 0j = N) = , where r and  denote
the levels of correlation and, without loss of generality, (weakly) exceed 1=2. A signal value of
1 can thus be interpreted as "strong evidence" of a breach, while 0 provides "weak evidence"
of such breach, while r and  can be interpreted as the quality of the evidence generated by
the two signals. Note that we use Latin letters for the signal of the plainti¤ and its precision
and the corresponding Greek letters for the signal of the judge and its precision.
We will moreover allow Ps information to be of variable quality (including the possibility
that P does not have any private information, so that r = 1=2), but assume throughout that
the trial has a given degree of reliability  > 1=2 private actions would otherwise never
help enforcing antitrust laws.
The sequence of events is as follows. Having observed its signal s, P chooses whether to
launch a complaint, in which case it must incur a xed cost, , which represents the expense
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incurred in retaining lawyers, preparing documents, institutional fees for opening a case, and
so on; di¤erent systems may result in di¤erent cost values, and thus encourage or discourage
plainti¤s to complain. Alternatively,  may be interpreted as the cost of collecting data for
initiating a private antitrust action6; what matters for our purposes is that P must send a
credible signal of its intent to proceed to a trial if necessary. In the latter interpretation we
can think of di¤erent values of  as characterizing di¤erent judicial regimes, with a high 
describing the European regime in which the costs are supported by plainti¤s, and a low 
describing the US discovery system in which many of the costs are borne by defendants.
Pre-trial bargaining then ensues between P and D. We model this by assuming that P
makes a single settlement o¤er R to D, which D may either accept or refuse. If D refuses
the o¤er, the case proceeds to a trial.
The trial generates the signal , on the basis of which J determines the outcome of the
trial (according to rules of procedure which we discuss below). The trial has a xed cost c,
borne by the losing party; we consider later the e¤ect of alternative divisions of the costs. If
a breach of law is established in court P is awarded damages F against D.
Formally, then, the timing of the game is the following:
Stage 0 : Nature chooses whether D can adopt a particular (anticompetitive or com-
petitive) conduct, in which case D chooses whether to take advantage of the opportunity;
whenever such a conduct is adopted, the game proceeds to Stage 1.
Stage 1 : P observes its signal s and chooses whether to launch a complaint, in which
case it pays  and chooses a settlement o¤er R.7
Stage 2 : D observes R and accepts or rejects the o¤er.
Stage 3 : If the o¤er is rejected, the case goes to trial;8 then Nature chooses , which
is observed by J : if a violation is found, D bears the cost c and pays F to P ; if instead no
violation is found, D pays nothing, while P bears the cost c.
Private complaints can help enforcing antirust laws by forcing law-breachers to compen-
sate plainti¤s. At the same time, though, law-abiding rms should not be deterred from
adopting e¢ cient, pro-competitive conduct. Therefore, the above-described system will be
6The judicial system usually set rules on the disclosure of documents and/or determine a certain amount
of evidence above which the action may be initiated.
7There is no loss of generality assuming that P always make a settlement o¤er once a case has been
opened: a su¢ ciently high o¤er will always be rejected and de facto amounts to no settlement o¤er. If J
observes whether an o¤er is being made (and possibly its content) and can take this into account in reaching
a decision, then allowing P to decide whether to make an o¤er might a¤ect the analysis.
8We thus rule out here the possibility that P withdraws the complaint in the absence of settlement. This
can correspond to specic legal provisions or implicitly supposes that P nds it optimal to go to trial. As
we will see (see the discussion after Proposition 3), this is indeed the case when c is small enough.
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helpful only if it "screens" violators of competition law from non-violators. This evidently
depends on the likely outcome of the trials, which in turn depends on the way in which the
Judge is constrained to use the evidence at her disposal, as well as on the kinds of relevant
evidence that are admissible. In many judicial proceedings some relevant evidence is not
admissible. For instance, juries in criminal cases may often not hear evidence about the ac-
cuseds previous convictions, even though this may well have some bearing on the probability
that the accused committed the crime in question. The proceedings are therefore constrained
to rely purely on evidence directly generated by the crime under investigation and may not
use background evidence. As we will see now, our analysis supports such restrictions on the
use of background evidence, due to what can be called the "innocents curse".
3.2 The innocents curse
As already noted in the literature on plea bargaining and civil litigation, pre-trial negotiations
are subject to a standard case of adverse selection. Going to trial exposes D to pay F + c if
it is found liable, and nothing otherwise; D will therefore be willing to settle as long as the
settlement o¤er R is lower than the expected cost of a trial, that is:
R   (F + c) ;
where  denotes the probability that D will be found liable, conditional on having com-
mitted a breach ( = B) or not ( = N). It follows that a Defendant who has not behaved
anticompetitively is more likely to refuse to settle, and thus to go to court, whenever it is
less likely to be found liable, i.e., whenever B > N . Indeed, if
N (F + c) < R < B (F + c) ;
then D will settle when it has committed a breach of law, and will instead reject the set-
tlement o¤er and rather go to trial when it did not breach the law. In such a case, the
Judge will only see defendants that have not committed a breach. It might be tempting
to conclude that such "background information" should be taken into account by the court
when reaching its decision. This would have perverse consequences, however, since it would
lead the Judge to decide systematically in favour of the Defendant, prompting in turn all
defendants, guilty or innocent, to refuse any settlement and instead always to go to court...
We now show that, because of this innocents curse, allowing the Judge to rely on back-
ground evidence about possible settlement negotiations would actually render private actions
quite ine¤ective in screening liable Defendants from non-liable ones.
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3.3 The negative role of background evidence
To see this, suppose that the Judge convicts the Defendant if and only if her posterior belief
about the existence of a violation, based on any relevant evidence, (weakly) exceeds some
threshold,  2 (0; 1). In practice, the Judge may benet from many sources of information
that are relevant to the case: the identity and history of the various parties, their reputation,
their behavior in related cases, and so forth. To keep the analysis simple, we will assume here
that the Judge does not have any specic pre-trial information, beyond the general structure
of the game described above (in particular, she does not observe any settlement o¤er9).
Assuming that J is fully rational, her posterior belief will then depend on (and only on) the ex
ante probability  of a breach of competition law (which depends on the equilibrium behavior
of the rms), as well as on the fact that the case has gone to trial after pre-trial bargaining
(together with P and D equilibrium settlement strategies), and nally on the signal 
generated by the trial. In the following, we will denote by e = Pr( = Bjtrial) Js equilibrium
interim belief, prior to observing the signal , about the likelihood that a Defendant who
proceeds to trial has indeed committed a breach of law, and by  = Pr( = Bj) her
posterior belief, given the signal  generated by the trial. Given , D will thus be found
liable when:
  :
Intuitively, J is more likely to nd a violation when she receives "strong evidence",
which in turn makes a violator more likely to lose the case; indeed, Bayesrule and  > 1=2
imply:
0 =
e (1  )e (1  ) + 1  e   1 =
ee+ 1  e (1  ) ; (2)
with a strict inequality whenever 0 < e < 1.10 This, together with  > 1=2, in turn implies









+ (1  ) Pr 0  








+ (1  ) Pr 1   ; (3)
with again a strict inequality whenever 0 < e < 1. Therefore, as noted above, a non-violator
is indeed more likely to resist settling.
9This rules out "signalling e¤ects" which could otherwise arise if Ps settlement o¤er was observed by
J . Here, Ps o¤er is only observed by D, which knows the true state  anyway, and has no impact on Js
beliefs.
10If e 2 (0; 1), 0 = 1=1 + 1 ee 1  < 1 = 1=1 + 1 ee 1  . If e = 1, then 0 = 1 = 1, whereas ife = 0, then 0 = 1 = 0.
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Anticipating that D will settle as long as
R  R   (F + c) ;
P will either o¤er to settle for RB, which is then only accepted by violators if RB > RN , or
for a lower amount, RN , which is then accepted by both types of Defendants. Moreover, any
D that is indi¤erent between settling or not will in equilibrium settle with probability one;
otherwise, P would rather deviate (undetected by J) and o¤er a slightly lower settlement,
in order to save the cost of trial.11 Thus, there is no equilibrium in which D randomizes
between settling or not along the equilibrium path.
We can therefore distinguish three candidate equilibrium congurations, depending on
whether  is above 1, between 1 and 0, or below 0:
 If > 1, then J never issues a conviction. As a result, RB = RN = 0, implying
that P will never open a case.12 Such an equilibrium is indeed supported by (out-of-
equilibrium) beliefs for J such that, in case of trial, e is small (e = 0, say).
 If  0, then J always issues a conviction in case of trial. As a result, RB = RN =
F +c, implying that P will open the case whenever  < F +c, and then systematically
settle for F + c there will thus never be a trial. Such an equilibrium can however be
supported only by very high (out-of-equilibrium) interim beliefs e.13
 Finally, if 1   > 0, in case of trial J convictsD when and only when there is strong
evidence of breach ( = 1), and the relevant settlement o¤ers are thus RB =  (F + c)
11Assume rst that that, in response to an o¤er R = R, D accepts to settle with probability . Ps
expected payo¤, conditional on , is then
R + (1  ) (F   (1  ) c) =  (F + c)  (1  ) c:
O¤ering to settle for a slightly lower R would break Ds indi¤erence (and either not a¤ect the other type
of Defendant, if it was not initially indi¤erent between settling or not, or a¤ect it in the same way, if it was
also indi¤erent) and avoid the expected cost of going to trial, thereby increasing Ps expected payo¤ by c.
12More precisely, P will never open a case whenever  > 0; if  = 0, P might be willing to open a case
but the outcome is formally equivalent, since P and D will settle for no compensation (R = 0).
13In particular, one would need e >  if, in the absence of any other background information, J would
convict D when and only when receiving a bad signal:
 (1  )
 (1  ) + (1  )  <  <

+ (1  ) (1  ) :
This would however be contrary to the "intuitive criterion" of Cho and Kreps (1987) which, given RB  RN ,
implies here that a Defendant who proceeds to trial is no less likely to be innocent than one taken at random
from the population.
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and RN = (1  ) (F + c) < RB. However, there is no equilibrium in which P would
o¤er RB, since then D would refuse to settle and go to trial when and only when
innocent, implying e = 0 and thus 1 = 0 = 0 < . There may exist an equilibrium
where P o¤ers to settle for RN , which is accepted by both types of D, but then again,
no trial occurs in this candidate equilibrium.
This discussion can be summarized as:
Proposition 1 When the Judge relies on full background evidence, there is no equilibrium
where the payo¤ of the Defendant depends on whether or not it has breached the law: either
the Plainti¤ never starts a case, or always starts a case but systematically settles with the
Defendant, for an amount that does not depend on the type of Defendant.
The proposition stresses that private actions are here completely ine¤ective in sorting out
violators from innocent Defendants: cases are either never started, or always settled for a
xed amount that is paid by violators and innocent Defendants alike. In neither case does a
violator end up worse o¤than a non-violator. This absence of "screening" stems from the fact
that: (i) it is always desirable for the Plainti¤ to settle with at least one type of Defendant,
in order to save on trial costs (and for the same reason, to settle with all Defendants of that
type); and: (ii) the Defendant is less likely to settle when innocent. As a result, there is no
separating equilibrium, since in any such an equilibrium all violators would settle while non-
violators would not do so; but then, anticipating that only non-violators would ever come
to trial, the Judge would never issue any convictions, which in turn would induce violators,
too, to resist settlements.
Suppose instead that the Judge is required to ignore any information relative to settle-
ment bargaining; then, given her pre-trial belief14  and the evidence generated by the trial
(i.e., the signal ), her posterior beliefs are respectively given by:
0 =
 (1  )
 (1  ) + (1  ) ; 1 =

+ (1  ) (1  ) :
If the trial generates evidence of "good quality" (i.e.,  close to 1), Js posteriors will be
close to 1 in case of strong evidence and close to 0 otherwise; therefore, as long as the trial
generates evidence of good enough quality, we will have
0 <  < 1; (4)
14These pre-trial belief can be based on the initial belief  but may however rely on additional elements,
such that Ps incentive to open a case given the quality of its own information.
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implying that J issues a conviction when and only when the trial generates strong evidence
of wrongdoing ( = 1). The same insight applies if the Judge is also restricted from using
any other background information (such as the numbers of opportunities, NB and NG, or the
probabilities B and G that particular conducts are adopted), and must for example "start"
instead from exogenous "beliefs" ( = 1=2, say), as long as the quality of trial evidence is
good enough. In all these cases, D is more likely to be convicted when it breaches the law,
since violators are convicted with probability  while innocent Defendants are convicted
only with probability 1   . Private actions are then more likely to treat violators more
harshly than non-violators; indeed, as we will see later, there can exist equilibria where P
"targets" violators (i.e. P o¤ers to settle for a large amount, NB, which is accepted by DB
but rejected by DN) and where, as a result, violators are indeed treated more harshly than
non-violators. This calls for constraining courts to rely purely on the evidence brought before
them, and not on additional background information such as the existence of a settlement
o¤er, its content, and so forth.
Fluet and Demougin (2006 and 2008) derive related results. In a model where agents
may cause harm depending on their level of care, they show that it is optimal to constrain
courts to use neutral normative priors about the case even if they know they are incorrect.
However, background evidence in their models means using even or unbiased priors about
the liability of the Defendants, while in our framework it is information coming from the
settlement negotiation (whether or not the settlement o¤er has been accepted). Relying
on such strategic information would prevent a system of private actions from fullling its
benecial screening function.
3.4 Uncertain costs
The above analysis relies in part on the assumption that P knows exactly "how far to go":
P knows how much a violator is willing to pay and is therefore able to "target" violators and
make sure that violators (and only violators) settle. To check the robustness of the analysis,
in this subsection we extend the framework so as to allow for some uncertainty about Ds
willingness to settle, by introducing a random cost of proceeding to trial. Specically, we
assume in this subsection that, in case of trial, besides the veriable cost c, a violator also
bears an additional cost k, which is uniformly distributed on an interval [0; K]. To x ideas,
we will assume that this additional cost is non-transferable, even if D wins the case. For a
violator, the expected cost of going to trial is then  (F + c) + k.15
15The same analysis applies when innocent Defendants, too, bear additional non-transferable costs, as
long as these additional costs remain small compared with the di¤erence in expected sanctions, measured
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We assume that (4) holds, so that in the absence of any background information about
settlement negotiations J would issue a conviction only in the case of strong evidence ( = 1).
If instead J can take settlement bargaining into consideration, there always exists an equi-
librium where no case is launched, supported by low (out-of-equilibrium) beliefs that would
lead J never to issue a conviction, and there may also exist an equilibrium where P o¤ers to
settle for a low amount RN , and D always accept whatever its type. None of these equilibria
"screens" violators from non-liable Defendants, however; such screening can only occur if P
targets violators, i.e., o¤ers to settle for RB > max fRN ; 0g, which is then accepted only by
(some of the) violators. When only a proportion  of violators settle, Js posterior beliefs,
, are given by
1 = 1() 
(1  )
(1  )+ (1  )(1  ) ; (5)
0 = 0 () 
(1  )(1  )
(1  )(1  ) + (1  ):
It is easy to check that, given (4), J never convicts D when there is weak evidence of breach:
0 () <.
16 Moreover, 1 (): (i) decreases as  increases; and (ii) equals 0 for  = 1 but
coincides with 1 > for  = 0. Thus, there exists a unique value ^ 2 (0; 1) such that










If  > ^, J never convicts D, implying that all Defendants, violators or not, would reject
any positive settlement. In contrast, any  2 [0; ^] may support a candidate equilibrium in
which: (i) P o¤ers to settle for RB () =  (F + c)+ (1  )K; (ii) D refuses to settle when
it is innocent and settles otherwise with probability  (namely, when k < K); and (iii) D
is convicted when (and only when) J receives strong evidence of a breach ( = 1). For this
to be an equilibrium, however, P must prefer to "target" violators (i.e., choose "RB" rather
than "RN") and moreover wish that its o¤er is accepted by a proportion  of violators.
Given its signal s and associated belief, b, that D has breached the law, Ps expected payo¤
by (2  1) (F + c). A similar analysis also applies when the additional cost k is ex post (observed and)
transferred to the losing party. The expected cost of going to trial is then  (F + c+ k) and the analytics








 (1  ) + (1  )  = 0 < :
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is equal to
WP () = b fRB () + (1  ) [F   (1  )c]g+ (1  b) [(1  )F   c]  
= b f ( (F + c) + (1  )K) + (1  ) [ (F + c)  c]g
+(1  b) [(1  ) (F + c)  c]  
=
hb+ 1  b (1  )i (F + c) + b (1  )K   1  b c  : (6)
Decreasing the settlement increases the proportion  of violators that accept it: it therefore
involves a trade-o¤ between acceptance and payo¤ in case of acceptance, which is reected
in the second term, b (1  )K; it moreover makes it more likely to avoid the trial cost,
which is reected in the third term,

1  b c. The overall expected payo¤ is concave in 
and the rst-order derivative is:
@WP
@
= b [c+K (1  2)] :
The optimal proportion  for P is thus equal to:













which exceeds 1 when K < c=2 and otherwise decreases as K increases. A screening equi-
librium can only exist when  (K)  ^  ; ; , which leads to:
Proposition 2 Suppose that violators bear an uncertain non-transferable cost of going to
trial k, uniformly distributed on the interval [0; K]: If courts can use background evidence,
then a screening equilibrium (i.e., an equilibrium in which the outcome of the settlement/trial
game depends on the Defendants type) exists only when
c
K






The proposition shows that the previous insight is quite robust. When K is low (i.e.,
little uncertainty about the Defendants cost in case of trial), there is again no scope for
screening out violators: in equilibrium, either no case is launched or a case is launched but
always settled, whether the Defendant is innocent or not. And the same holds true, however
large K is, whenever ^  1
2
, which is indeed the case when the evidence is of poor quality,
reected by a low , when the pre-trial belief  is low, or when the standard of proof  is
high.
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4 Trials without background evidence
From now on, we will assume that the Judge must reach her decision purely on the basis of
the evidence brought before her, and suppose that J nds D liable of a breach of law (only)
in case of "strong evidence" of such a breach, that is, if and only if  = 1. We study in this
section the behavior of the interested parties in the settlement/trial game, as a function of
Ps belief about the likelihood of a breach. That is, we assume throughout this section that
P believes that D has broken the law with probability ^, and consider Ps resulting incentive
to open a case as well as its choice of a settlement o¤er. This probability ^ depends in turn
on rmsinitial choices (engaging in a pro- or anti-competitive action when the opportunity
arises) as well as on the information obtained by P ; conversely rmsinitial choices depend
on expectations of the behavior of the Plainti¤ in the ensuing trial/settlement game. We
consider in the next sections the implications of this interplay for the optimal design of the
rules for private actions.
4.1 The settlement game
Suppose that P proposes to settle for an amount R. If D rejects the o¤er and the case goes
to trial, a violation will be found found with probability  if D has indeed committed a
breach of competition law, and only with probability 1    otherwise. Anticipating this, D
accepts to settle if
R 
(
R   (F + c) if  = B
R  (1  ) (F + c) if  = N
It is never optimal for P to o¤er a prohibitively high settlement that would be rejected by
both types of D, since settling allows the parties to save the cost of the trial: indeed, asking
instead for R leads to the same outcome (i.e., going to trial) when D is a non-violator, but
yields a higher expected payo¤ to a violator, since going to trial gives P an expected payo¤
equal to F   (1  ) c = R   c < R. Two settlement proposals are therefore relevant:
either a high amount, R, only accepted by violators, or a low amount, R, accepted by all
Defendants.17
If P asks for a low amount, R, it earns
R = (1  ) (F + c) ; (7)
17The benet of saving the cost of the trial also implies that it is best for the Plainti¤ to have an o¤er
accepted with probability 1 by all the Defendants that are indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting it. Also,
starting from any R < R which di¤ers from R, a slightly higher o¤er would be accepted by the same type(s)
of Defendants and would thus be better for P. Hence, R and R constitute the only relevant o¤ers.
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since both types of Defendant are willing to settle; if P asks instead for a high amount, R,
it earns
bR + (1  b) [(1  )F   c] = b (F + c) + (1  b) [(1  )F   c] ; (8)
since an innocent D prefers going to the trial. P favors a low amount when the payo¤ in (7)
exceeds that in (8), that is, when
b <   1
2
and c > c 
b(2  1)F
1  2b :





D ; respectively be the payo¤ of the Plainti¤, a violator (type B) and an
innocent defendant (type N).
 When b   or c  c, P is "aggressive", that is, demands a high settlement com-
pensation; as a result, the violator settles and the non-violator refuses to settle; the
payo¤s are then:
WP = b (F + c) + (1  b) [(1  )F   c]  
=
hb+ 1  b (1  )i (F + c)  1  b c  ;
WBD =   (F + c) ;
WND =   (1  ) (F + c) :
 When b <  and c > c, P is less aggressive and o¤ers a low settlement compensation,
which is always accepted by the Defendant, irrespective of her type; the payo¤s are
then:
WP = (1  ) (F + c)  ;
WBD = W
N
D =   (1  ) (F + c) :
Finally, the Plainti¤ will decide to initiate a case whenever WP > 0; that is, when
 <  =
hb+ 1  b (1  )i (F + c)  1  b c if b  or c  c
 < 
0
= (1  ) (F + c) if b <  and c > c
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium outcomes, as a function of the cost of complaint 
(horizontal axis) and of the cost of trial c (vertical axis); each case corresponds to di¤erent
beliefs b, keeping constant the other exogenous parameters  and F .
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Figure 1
We draw together these ndings in the following Proposition 3:
Proposition 3 In the subgame perfect equilibrium of the private action game when courts
are constrained to use no background evidence:
i) if b  or c  c, and in addition  < , P opens a case and is "aggressive",
demanding a high settlement R   (F + c), which is accepted by violators and refused by
non-violators, who go to court.
ii) otherwise, either P does not open a case or P is "non-aggressive", demanding a low
settlement R = (1  ) (F + c), which is accepted by violators and non-violators alike.
This proposition stresses that private actions succeed in sorting out violators from non-
violators only when plainti¤s are aggressive in pre-trial negotiations, which in turn requires
that breaches of competition law are likely and/or trial costs are not too large. In that case,
there indeed exists an equilibrium where P opens a case if doing so is not too costly, and
then asks for a high settlement, which is accepted only by violators.
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As already noted, we assumed throughout that, once launched, a complaint goes to
trial in the absence of settlement. In the absence of legal provisions ensuring that this is
automatically the case, following a rejection P indeed chooses to go to trial as long as
(1  )F  c,18 which is satised when the costs of a trial are small enough; we will see
that it is indeed optimal to maintain c as low as possible, which thus validates the analysis.
4.2 Comparative statics
Proposition 3 indicates that the main parameters of the model inuence outcomes in two
ways: they a¤ect not only the plainti¤sincentives to open a case, but also - when a case is
launched - their incentives to behave aggressively in pre-trial negotiations. Aggressiveness
is highly desirable from an enforcement perspective, since it is only when plainti¤s are
aggressive that violators and non-violators end up facing di¤erent costs - and only thus can
the fear of private actions create a greater disincentive for harmful actions than for benecial
ones. So it is only by encouraging plainti¤s to be aggressive that private actions can have a
benecial impact on the behavior of rms.
It can be noted that P is more likely to be aggressive when it has a high prior  of wrong-
doing. This conrms the intuition that, from an enforcement perspective, "good" plainti¤s
are those that have obtained evidence of wrongdoing. Fortunately, these are also the plain-
ti¤s that are most likely to open a case. Indeed, the expected payo¤of an aggressive plainti¤,
given by:
WP =
hb+ 1  b (1  )i (F + c)  1  b c  ; (9)
increases with b:
@WP
@b = (2  1) (F + c) + c > 0:
18When (1  )F < c but F > (1  ) c, there may however exist a similar equilibrium in which Ps
settlement o¤er R is rejected by D when innnocent and accepted with probability p < 1 otherwise; Ps
expected payo¤ becomes bpR + 1  bp W^P (p), where W^P , Ps expected payo¤ following a refusal, is
equal to:
W^P (p) =
b (1  p) [F   (1  ) c] + (1  b) [(1  )F   c]
1  bp :
This equilibrium exists as long as (i) W^P (p)  0 and (ii) P favors a high settlement o¤er, which is the
case when either b   (p)  1p+2 1 , or c  c (p)  b(2 1)F1 (p+2 1)b . This is for example the case when
W^P (0) =  [F   (1  ) c] + (1  ) [(1  )F   c] > 0 (so that W^P (p) > 0 for p low enough) and eitherb >  (0)  12 1 or c > c (0)  b(2 1)F1 (2 1)b (so that the other conditions hold for any p  1). Note that,
in this equilibrium, P is deterred from breaking DBs indi¤erence (by slightly decreasing the settlement
amount, say), since this would eliminate the threat of trial (Nalebu¤ (1987) studies similar equilibria in a
context with a continuum of defendant types).
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Therefore, the cost of launching a complaint, , determines both the number and the
"quality" of the plainti¤s that will open a case: a reduction in  (or subsidizing the pro-
ceedings) increases the expected payo¤ of a potential plainti¤, but will also attract plainti¤s
with a lower prior b.
It can furthermore be checked that plainti¤s are more likely to be aggressive when:
 The cost of a trial, c, is small; it thus appears desirable to limit these costs and/or
subsidize the proceedings, in order to encourage plainti¤s to be aggressive and ensure
in this way that violators are sorted out from innocent Defendants.
 Courts are reliable (i.e.,  is high): an increase in  reduces the threshold  and
increases the threshold c; both e¤ects tend to make it more likely that plainti¤s will
be aggressive. An increase in  moreover encourages "good plainti¤s" (i.e., those with
a high prior, namely, b > 1=2) to launch a complaint while discouraging bad plainti¤s
(those for which b < 1=2), since @WP=@ = 2b   1 (F + c) is positive if and only ifb > 1=2.
 The compensation F is large, since an increase in F increases c; increasing the compen-
sation also encourages plainti¤s to open a case

@WP=@F = b+ 1  b (1  ) > 0,
and more so for good plainti¤s

@2WP=@F@b = (2  1) > 0.
5 Designing the Rules
We now study how to design the rules so as to enhance the role of private litigation in
antitrust enforcement. In particular, we analyze how to inuence the number and quality of
cases, as well as the optimal ways to encourage private actions.
To understand the e¤ect of a system of private actions on the whole array of relevant
behavior (not just on cases but also on rms willingness to undertake anti-competitive
actions) we need to model more explicitly the benets that rms can derive from legitimate
as well as from anticompetitive actions. We shall also allow potential plainti¤s to be more or
less well informed. This implies a relationship between the number and the quality of cases,
which depends on the information the Plainti¤ has when launching a complaint.
We will denote by  the private benet from committing an anticompetitive action and
by  the benet of undertaking a legitimate competitive action, and assume that these
benets vary across rms. That is, at date 0, each of the NB rms that have an opportunity
to breach the law learns the benet  it could derive from doing so, and then decides whether
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to commit the breach or not. Similarly, each of the NN rms that have an opportunity to
undertake a legitimate action learns the benet it would so obtain. For the sake of exposition,




and [0; ], respectively.
5.1 When are private actions useful?
The decisions of the rms determine how many actions are undertaken and, among those,
the proportion , as dened in equation (1), of breaches of competition law. Thus, with
probability , Plainti¤s suspect the existence of a Breach of competition law and with
probability 1    plainti¤s suspect No Breach. Then, at date 1, each P receives a signal s
which correctly reports whether a violation has occurred with probability r, and makes an
incorrect report with probability (1  r). We allow r, the parameter measuring the quality
of the signals, to vary across plainti¤s (they may be more or less well acquainted with the
industry, have access to di¤erent types of evidence, and so forth) and assume that it is
independently and uniformly distributed over [1=2; 1].
For a Plainti¤, conditional on having received a signal suggesting a breach (s = 1), the
probability that a rm has indeed committed a breach is:







Similarly, the probability that a rm is a violator when the Plainti¤ receives the signal s = 0







The two probabilities b1 and b0 coincide with the prior  for r = 1=2 and are respectively
increasing and decreasing in r.
Building on the above analysis, private actions cannot sort out violators from innocent
defendants when plainti¤s are not "aggressive". We will therefore assume from now on that
the parameters are indeed such that any P launching a complaint then behaves aggressively.
It su¢ ces for example that c is small enough, and as we will see, it is indeed desirable to
keep c as low as possible subsidizing the costs of trial if necessary.
Also, it is clearly not a good idea to encourage plainti¤s that have received no evidence
of wrongdoing (s = 0, implying b = b0 < ): it would be better to rely on purely random
actions. Conversely, since Ps expected payo¤, given by (9), increases with b (and thus with
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the quality r of the signal s = 1) and decreases with , the authorities can use the cost of
launching a complaint, , in order to control the number and thus the quality of cases. More
precisely, given F and c, for any signal quality threshold er, adjusting the cost  of launching
a complaint to the adequate level ensures that the plainti¤s that open a case are precisely
those (i) whose quality of signal is at least er and (ii) who received evidence of wrongdoing
(s = 1). It su¢ ces to choose:
 =
er
er + (1  ) (1  er) [(2  1) (F + c) + c] + (1  ) (F + c)  c: (12)
What is the benet of a higher or a lower value of er? A higher value makes it less likely
that a case is brought, but ensures that any case brought is more likely to succeed. We now
explore the optimal trade-o¤ of these two e¤ects.
For a violator, the probability that the plainti¤ brings an action is therefore the proba-
bility that the plainti¤ has a r > er, multiplied by the (expected) probability that the signal
observed by that plainti¤ takes the value B, namely
[2 (1  er)] (1 + er)
2
= 1  er2:
For a non-violator the probability of an action is
[2 (1  er)] 1  (1 + er)
2

= (1  er)2  < 1  er2 :
Given these probabilities of litigation, rms will undertake good or bad actions respectively
if (
  (1  er2)  (F + c) = (1  er2) b;
  (1  er)2 (1  ) (F + c) = (1  er)2 b; (13)





and [0; ], the probability that a rm acts on the opportunity






and the probability that a non-violation is committed is
N = 1  (1  er)2 b ;
so that the proportion  is given by
 =
















We can now characterize the optimal choice of the quality threshold. Some parameters,
such as the cost of launching a complaint, , or the cost of a trial, c, a¤ect not only the rms
behavior but have also a direct impact on social welfare. For the sake of presentation, in a rst
step we will suppose that these are not real costs but constitute instead a monetary transfer
to the authorities; this will allow us to have a clearer preliminary analysis of the impact of
these and other parameters on the rmsincentives to undertake pro- and anticompetitive
actions. In a second step, we will discuss how the policy should be adapted when taking into
consideration the social costs of legal proceedings.
When the costs  and c take the form of (socially neutral) legal fees, the social welfare
function can be written as:
W = NN










where the parameters b and b only depend on  and on the sum F + c. Di¤erentiating the
welfare function with respect to er yields:
@W
@er = 2NN (1  er) bG  2NBer bL;
@2W
@er2 =  2NN bG  2NB bL < 0:
It follows that if
NNGb=
NBLb= = 1   NNGNBL   1;
private actions are not useful: in that case, @W=@er < 0 for any er > 1=2, implying that it
would be preferable to rely on purely random actions even ignoring the actual costs of legal
proceedings; audits by the authority might furthermore allow for streamlined proceedings
and lower costs. This is the case when:
 courts are highly reliable (i.e.,  is high), so that there is less of a need to rely on
evidence brought by third parties;
 there are relatively more opportunities for anticompetitive actions (i.e., the ratio
NB=NN is high), these anticompetitive actions generate a large social cost compared
with the benet of the pro-competitive ones (L=G is high) and are comparatively easy
to deter (= is low), so that it is socially desirable to discourage anticompetitive










private actions can provide a useful way to enforce antitrust laws. In this case, the optimal















That is, the optimal cut o¤point for informed litigants requires them to have signals that are
at least as informative as the relative value of good projects among those that are discouraged
by indiscriminate litigation. As a result, fewer Plainti¤s should be encouraged to launch a
case (i.e., er increases) when for example there are relatively more opportunities for good
actions than for bad ones (NN=NB increases), or when these good actions are relatively
more valuable than the bad ones are costly (G=L increases). Note that it is always optimal
to encourage only those Plainti¤s that not only have obtained evidence of wrongdoing (i.e.,
they received a signal suggesting a breach, s = 1), but whose information is moreover
su¢ ciently precise. Indeed, condition (16) implies er > 1=2; the corresponding legal fee for
launching a complaint is then such that  =  > 0.
The welfare function is decreasing in the trial costs c when keeping F+c constant. Again,
this implies that not all ways of encouraging private actions are equally good in terms of
enforcement: the authorities should for example reduce c and compensate it by F so as to
keep F + c constant. We summarize these ndings in the following proposition:
Proposition 4 Ignoring the social costs of legal proceedings, private actions by informed
plainti¤s perform better than purely random actions if and only if (16) holds, that is, when
court proceedings do not generate su¢ cient evidence ( < 1) and when anti-competitive ac-
tions are relatively protable (= high) while pro-competitive actions are relatively desirable
(NNG=NBL also high). Moreover, when private actions are useful:
 Given F and c, the monetary costs  of opening a case should not be set as low as
possible, but rather high enough to strike a balance between the need to deter anti-
competitive actions without deterring legitimate pro-competitive actions. Specically
 should be set so as to promote actions only by those plainti¤s who have received a
signal suggesting a breach (s = 1) and whose precision er lies above a threshold er > 1=2;
this threshold moreover increases (implying that fewer cases should be opened) with the
relative value of good projects among those that are discouraged by litigation.
 Keeping F + c constant, the monetary costs of a trial, c, should be reduced (and the
damages, F , adjusted accordingly), so as to ensure that active plainti¤s will be "ag-
gressive" in pre-trial negotiations, and thus that private actions will succeed in sorting
out violators from innocent defendants.
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Proposition 4 stresses that private actions are useful when plainti¤s information help
complement the evidence generated by court proceedings, and when pro-competitive actions
are desirable but easily deterred. It is moreover then better to encourage only those plainti¤s
who have signicant private information about the presence of anti-competitive actions. In
other words, the decision maker should take care not to encourage "frivolous actions", i.e.
actions initiated by Plainti¤s who do not have enough private information to improve the
decision of the court about the case. In addition, it is optimal to rely as much as possible
on the damages F rather than on the trial costs c. While both dimensions tend to impose a
higher cost on violators than on non-violators, high trial costs tend to discourage plainti¤s
from being aggressive, which is the only way in which private actions can sort violators from
innocent defendants. Thus, keeping F + c constant, it is optimal to increase the damages F
and reduce the trial costs c as much as possible (and even to subsidize trial costs, to ensure
that plainti¤s are aggressive in pre-trial negotiations).19
A more di¢ cult issue concerns the optimal level of F . It is rst worth noting that, since
the ratio b=b only depends on , er is independent of F ; thus, higher values of F (which
raise the returns to private actions) require the authorities to raise  so as to maintain
the level of er unchanged. Second, it can be checked that under our assumptions, it is
actually optimal to increase F so as to deter all anticompetitive actions. Indeed, as long as
(1  er2)  (F + c) <  and (1  er)2 (1  ) (F + c) < , W jer=er is increasing in F :
@W
@F
er=er =   (1  ) NNG (1  er)2 + NBL  1  (er)2
= (1  er) (1  ) NNG












and the above expression is non-negative since (1  er) (1  )NNG=  0 and
  (1  er) +  (1 + er) =  + (2 + )
1 + 
=   0:
This nding clearly relies on our assumptions of constant social values G and L attached
to pro- and anticompetitive actions, together with a uniform distribution of the private
benets  and , which implies that the ratio of good and bad actions deterred also remains
19As noted before, reducing cmoreover makes it more likely that Plainti¤s will go to trial in case Defendants
refuse to settle, which also contributes to making private actions successful in sorting out violators from non-
violators. Moreover, as we will see later, it is socially desirable to reduce the actual costs of court proceedings.
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constant as F changes. This result implies that, if







1  er 1   (> 1) ;
then it is optimal to deter all anticompetitive actions, at the cost of discouraging all pro-
competitive ones as well: the above insight shows that it is indeed desirable to increase F
as long F + c < = (1  er2) ; = (1  er)2 (1  ), that is, as long as doing so deters addi-
tional good and bad actions; and when instead = (1  er)2 (1  ) < F + c < = (1  er2) ,
all procompetitive actions are deterred but increasing F further allows to deter additional
anticompetitive ones. It is thus desirable to choose F + c larger than = (1  er2) , so as to






1  er 1  ;
the amount F should instead be set "just" large enough to deter all anticompetitive actions:
F , that is, such that (1  er2)  (F + c) = ; in that case, increasing F further would discour-
age additional procompetitive actions without bringing any other benet. More generally, F
should not be set too high whenever increasing deterrence would increasingly deter valuable
actions rather than bad ones.
5.2 Costly proceedings
In practice, launching a complaint and going to trial involves real costs, which should be
taken into consideration when evaluating the social desirability of private actions as an
enforcement tool. To x ideas, suppose that the costs borne by the parties,  and c, can be
decomposed into two parts: actual costs, ^ and c^, and monetary transfers,   ^ and c  c^.
The social welfare can then be written as:
W
er; c^; ^ = NNN (er)G  (1  er)2 c^+ ^ NBB (er)L+  1  er2 ^
= W (er; 0; 0)  N (er)c^+ ^  B (er) ^;
where N (er)  (1  er)2NNN (er) and B (er)  (1  er2)NBB (er) respectively denote the
numbers of complaints respectively triggered by procompetitive and anticompetitive actions
(and as before, b = (1  ) (F + c), b =  (F + c) and er can be controlled through the total
real plus monetary cost ).
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Clearly, the costs of proceedings, c^ and ^, are socially undesirable and should thus be
minimized.20 They also have an e¤ect on the optimal policy, however. A standard revealed
preference shows indeed that an increase in either c^ or ^ calls for adapting the rules so as to
reduce the number of complaints:
 An increase in the actual costs of trial, c^, reduces the number of complaints triggered
by procompetitive actions. Suppose for example that the trial cost c^ increases from c^0 to
c^00 > c^0, and denote by er0 and er00 the corresponding optimal thresholds; by assumption,
W
er0; c^0; ^  W er00; c^0; ^ and W er00; c^00; ^  W er0; c^00; ^, which implies:
W (er0; 0; 0)  N (er0)c^0 + ^  B (er0) ^  W (er00; 0; 0)  N (er00)c^0 + ^  B (er00) ^;
W (er00; 0; 0)  N (er00)c^00 + ^  B (er00) ^  W (er0; 0; 0)  N (er0)c^00 + ^  B (er0) ^:
Summing-up these two inequalities yields:
[N (er00)  N (er0)] (c^00   c^0)  0:
Therefore, an increase in c^ leads to an adjustment in the threshold er (through the
choice of ) so as to reduce the number of complaints triggered by procompetitive
actions.
 It can similarly be checked that an increase in the actual cost of launching a complaint,
^, leads to a reduction in the total number of complaints, N (er) + B (er).
5.3 Alternative cost sharing rules
We have assumed so far that the losing party bears the costs of the trial, which corresponds
to the so-called British rule. We now check that this rule is indeed desirable. To see this,
denote by cP and cD the costs directly born by P and D, respectively, and suppose that D
pays a share P of Ps costs when losing, whereas P pays of share D of Ds costs when
losing. Our initial rule corresponds to P = D = 1, whereas the rule commonly described
20In practice, however, there may a be a trade-o¤ between the costs of the legal proceedings and the
accuracy of the decision-making process. Excessively summary proceedings may for example save costs at the
expense of the quality of the evidence generated by the trial. This could be accomodated in our framework by
introducing a negative relationship between  and c (so that  decreases as c increases); the present analysis
then shows how the other policy parameters (such as  or er) should be adjusted when optimizing over c and
.
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as the American rule corresponds to P = D = 0. In the US, however, there exists an
asymmetry in that the costs of a plainti¤ may be borne by the defendant when the latter
is found liable, whereas a defendant always bears its cost, whether it is found liable or not.
This would correspond here to P > D = 0.
With these sharing rules, the relevant costs for violators and non-violators respectively
become: ( b =  (F + P cP + cD) + (1  ) (1  D) cD;b = (1  ) (F + P cP + cD) +  (1  D) cD: (18)
It follows that, starting from any limited sharing rule satisfying P ; D < 1, a simultaneous
increase in both shares can be used to deter anti-competitive actions further and encourage










increases b and, at the same time, reduces b. Therefore, it is always optimal to increase
the share of the cost borne by the losing party up to the point where at least one party is
completely reimbursed when winning in particular, the above-mentioned "American" and
"US" rules cannot be optimal. It can similarly be checked that, for " > 0, simultaneously
increasing D by D = (1  ) "=cD and F by F = " increases b (by  2   (1  )2 " >
0) while keeping b constant; this change thus further deters anticompetitive actions without
discouraging any additional procompetitive ones. It follows that it would always be optimal
to have the defendant reimbursed for its costs when it is not found liable (i.e., D = 1).21
When asymmetric cost sharing rules between the Plainti¤and the Defendant are allowed,
the English Rule may therefore not be the most e¢ cient in discouraging low-probability-of-
prevailing plainti¤s and in encouraging high-probability-of-prevailing plainti¤s as this was
suggested by Shavell (1982) and Katz (1990).
5.4 Compensating defendants
The previous remark stresses that, in order to reduce the litigation burden on non-violators,
Defendants who are found non-liable should be reimbursed for the costs they incur during
the trial. It may actually be desirable to go further and award a compensation C to successful
21Interestingly, the same argument does not apply to the costs of the plainti¤: any change in F and P
that deters additional anticompetitive actions must increase F+P cP , in which case it also deters additional
procompetitive actions.
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Defendants. For violators, the expected cost of going to trial would now be given by
b =  (F + c)  (1  )C
whereas the cost to non-violators would be:
b = (1  ) (F + c)  C
It is then possible to deter all anticompetitive actions, while encouraging all procompetitive
ones, by increasing simultaneously the damages awarded to successful Plainti¤s, F , and the
compensation attributed to successful Defendants, C. Indeed, for any given F , it is possible
to maintain b = 0 by choosing
C (F )  1  

(F + c) : (19)
It then su¢ ces to increase F (and C = C (F )) su¢ ciently, namely, so as to satisfy 
1  er2 b =  1  er2 2  1

(F + c)  ; (20)
to deter all anticompetitive actions. In other words, since  is perfectly known, it is possible
fully to compensate the Defendant with the appropriate C for unfounded cases, which in
turn allows for deterring all actions without discouraging desirable ones. In the absence of
any restraint on the levels of F and C, this mechanism can work even with very few active
Plainti¤s that is, even when er is close to 1. Thus, even if legal proceedings are costly (c^ > 0
and/or ^ > 0), in the limit it is possible to deter all anticompetitive actions at no cost (on the
principle that a high enough ne can always compensate for a low probability of detection).
Note however that the required levels for F and C tend to innity as er approaches 1.
Summing up:
Proposition 5 When successful defendants can be compensated with a sum C, F should
be set as high as is required to deter all violations of competition law, and C as high as is
required to ensure that no pro-competitive actions are deterred. For any given er, the minimal
levels of F and C are F = 
2 1

1 er2   c and C = 1 2 1.
When legal proceedings are costly, in the absence of any restriction on F and C, this
mechanism can (almost) achieve the rst-best by choosing er close to 1 and by adjusting F
and C accordingly.
As we have shown above, encouraging private actions increases the litigation burden on
non-violators as well. Proposition 5 shows that one way to minimize this is to allow courts to
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give a compensation for defendants found non-liable as there exists a level of compensation
such that, when the damages paid by defendants found liable are high enough, all violations
of competition would be deterred without reducing the rmsincentives to engage in pro-
competitive actions.
This result is consistent with Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1996) who show that compensating
winning Plainti¤s allows to achieve the desired degree of deterrence with lower litigation
costs. However, in their model Defendants are always liable while in ours, some Defendants
may undertake legitimate competitive actions. Compensating winning Defendants in our
analysis therefore allows the Judge not only to achieve the desired degree of deterrence
but also to screen liable from non liable Defendants. This decreases the number of anti-
competitive actions without deterring legitimate pro-competitive actions.
The proposition o¤ers a useful benchmark but considers an extreme case which is quite
unrealistic, since it assumes away any limits, political or practical, to the levels of damages
and compensation payments that can be enforced. In practice rms may have limited liability
and various institutional constraints may also limit the damages as well as the compensation
that can be awarded to the parties. Whenever such constraints are binding, they will put a
cap on the admissible levels of F and C. Given these caps, the analysis we have made of
the factors determining the optimal threshold er will remain relevant. Interestingly, a cap
on the amount of damages, F , would also call for limiting the compensation C. And given
that there are limits on the levels of nes, optimal deterrence of anti-competitive actions
may require lowering er substantially below 1 so as to provide a su¢ ciently high probability
of detection of law-breaking. Note that the costs of legal proceedings will imply choosing
a level of er higher (and thus a probability of detection lower) than if such costs could be
ignored.
Even in the absence of any restriction on compensations and damages, risk aversion
may limit their desired levels. To be sure, risk aversion means that lower sanctions are
needed to deter violations; but these sanctions would also have a greater negative impact
on procompetitive actions as well. And there may be no realistic level of compensation that
could simultaneously be extracted from unsuccessful plainti¤s and compensate non-violators
for the risk of losing their case.22
The arguments of this section nevertheless provide strong grounds for concluding that
the payment of compensation to successful defendants can go a long way towards counter-
22For example, if rms are innitely risk-averse, the mere prospect of being ned with positive probabilty
would su¢ ce to discourage procompetitive actions, whatever compensation C successful defendants may
obtain.
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acting what might otherwise be a serious drawback of a system of private actions - namely
its potential for discouraging legitimate pro-competitive behavior as well as illegal anti-
competitive behavior. In e¤ect such a dual system of nes-plus-compensation would help
to ensure that the kinds of actions that took place would be ones that plainti¤s felt very
condent they would win. Any doubts about using such compensation, on the grounds that
it will be di¢ cult for plainti¤s to feel a high enough degree of condence in a fallible judicial
system, imply in turn that public policy should think very carefully before using a system of
actions brought by private plainti¤s to make a substantial contribution to competition law
enforcement.
6 Conclusion
What have we learned? The model we have developed is very stylized and evidently fails to
do justice to many important aspects of reality. However, the main conclusions that emerge
do not appear to be artefacts of the models simplications. First, although the purpose
of a system of private actions is to encourage parties who have private information about
antitrust violations to contribute that information to the enforcement process, the fact that
the parties engage in pre-trial bargaining means that the use of that information has to be
traded o¤against the need to create the right incentives for that bargaining. If all defendants
settle on identical terms the system will fail to deter those who have genuinely broken the
law. However, to ensure that those who have broken the law should face signicantly higher
costs than those who have not, we show that courts should not use Bayesian reasoning about
background probabilities but should rather restrict their decision-making to the bare facts
of the case.
Although this conclusion applies to any judicial process with plea-bargaining, the context
of antitrust raises some particular issues that are at the heart of our analysis. It is not enough
for the judicial procedure to deter law-breaking; it must also avoid deterring legitimate pro-
competitive activity, which is often di¢ cult to distinguish from anti-competitive actions
without signicant investigation, unlike many other forms of criminal activity. This sets
important constraints upon the design of a system of private actions. In particular, we
argue that simply lowering the costs of such actions is not the right way to foster private
enforcement, since this encourages well-founded and poorly-founded lawsuits alike. Instead
we argue that the right way to do so is to increase nes, which are more costly in expectation
to those who have broken the law than to those who have not. Since increasing nes will also
deter legitimate pro-competitive actions we argue for a system of compensation, to be paid by
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unsuccessful plainti¤s to defendants who win their case. In principle, if rms were perfectly
risk neutral and there were no limits to the level of either nes or compensation payments,
such a mechanism could perfectly balance the need to deter law-breaking and encourage
pro-competitive behavior. However, considerations of limited liability and risk-aversion will
restrict the extent to which law-breaking can be deterred and innocent pro-competitive
actions encouraged. Some degree of risk for innocent defendants will be impossible to avoid.
Some simple policy conclusions that follow from this include:
 Private actions should not be encouraged unless they are likely to impose substantially
higher expected costs on antitrust violators than on non-violators;
 Private actions should be encouraged only when potential plainti¤s are likely to have
information that can useful complement the evidence generated by court proceedings.
 If they are to be encouraged, it is better to do so by raising the level of damages
than by lowering the costs of opening a case, since the former gives a greater relative
encouragement to well-founded cases;
 The adverse e¤ects of private actions on innocent defendants can to some extent be
mitigated by requiring unsuccessful plainti¤s to pay compensation to defendants.
 The courts need to be constrained to convict on the basis of available evidence without
taking into account background proportions of violators and non-violators who go to
trial.
Facilitating private actions may have some merits but our paper has shown that it is as
important to do more than simply ensure that the courts have the best information on which
to make their judgments. Instead of having a principal role in sorting the innocent from the
guilty, the courts are - much more importantly - the background threat that gives credibility
to a process in which the innocent are sorted from the guilty much earlier, in the (nowadays)
smoke-free rooms where pre-trial bargaining takes place. What happens at this stage is of
crucial importance for ensuring that a system of private actions fosters rather than inhibits
competition.
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